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The person is the claim subject_claim names, sub by default and oid for Entra ID, and a plane switched to another claim moves each person it already knows once, at their next sign-in

Decision 751 · accepted · 2026-10-02 · issue #267

Entra's sub is pairwise, a different string in every app registration and no attribute its SCIM client can send, so the person SCIM made and the same person signing in were two rows. - One setting, every door. subject_claim (TROUPE_OIDC_SUBJECT_CLAIM, plane.oidc.subjectClaim) is read in Login.from_claims/1, which the CLI's and the desktop app's exchange, the console's sign-in and an MCP client's provider token all go through. SCIM's subject stays externalId, else userName; for Entra the provisioning mapping sends objectId as externalId. oid is unique within a tenant and the plane trusts one tenant's issuer, so tid is not part of it. A token without the claim is refused as {:no_subject, claim}, which names it. A provider whose sub already is what SCIM sends keeps the default, and nothing changes there. - The deployment's, not the console's. Shown on the Identity provider card and not editable there, as provisioning_mode is (736): switching it moves people, and switching back does not move them back, since somebody moved to oid is not found under their sub. A setting reset cannot undo is not one to offer beside a reset. - A move, not a fresh start. Somebody not found under the claim's value but found under the sub the same token carries is the same person by the provider's word in one signed token, and that token would have signed in as them the day before, so moving them gives it nothing it did not have. Their row is renamed. If SCIM provisioned them under the new value first, which is the order an Entra rollout usually goes in, the old row is folded into that one and removed, so SCIM's own id for the person stays good; their own spend ceiling is kept where SCIM's row has none. Moved is every column that says who: a session's owner and the sponsor in a run's origin (whose cap it counts against), ACL entries, shares made out to them, the teams they administer, triggers' notify, usage records and open reservations, and the principals they sponsor (left behind, deprovisioning them would leave those firing). What says who did, the hash-chained audit trail and every *_by, keeps the name it was written with. One transaction with the old row locked, so two devices signing in at once move the person once; afterwards nobody is under the old value, and the next sign-in has nothing to do. - A plane token minted before the move is refused, unauthenticated with "no such user", as a disabled principal's is, because the router resolves the subject on every request. Honouring it would need a second name per person that every lookup by subject knew, for one token lifetime of fifteen minutes; a client exchanges again on its own. A console session holding the old name is turned away and signs in again. - The key manager is not moved, since the plane holds no credential that can read or write it (375, 377), and does not need to be: a person's name there is not their subject (755). - In gitops mode a trigger's notify is the repository's, and the next change to the resource puts back whatever the repository says.

Governs: apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/identity.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/identity/user.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/login.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/scim.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/settings.ex, apps/troupe_plane/priv/repo/migrations/20261002000754_scim_user_name.exs, apps/troupe_plane/priv/repo/migrations/20261002000755_person_kms_name.exs, config/runtime.exs