A daemon sealing a private session names the epoch it holds in every write it asks the plane to sign, and the plane signs nothing for an epoch another device has claimed past, so a device that lost the session writes nothing more under its prefix¶
Decision 800 · accepted · 2026-10-06 · issue #441
- The choice: the presign names the epoch. A daemon holds no object-storage
credential, so it cannot write a byte under a session's prefix without asking the plane
to sign that one key first (
ObjectStore.Signedsigns each object just before it puts it, and keeps no URL). That request is the fence:session.presigntakesepoch, the one the caller holds, and refuses one the row has moved past withstale_version, signing nothing. It costs no round trip, since every write already makes this one, and the plane compares the epoch with the row it already reads to check the session is the caller's. The segment, the manifest and a snapshot are each signed only while the device still holds the session. - Not reporting, or asking, first. Reporting the seal before the upload undoes the
sealer's upload-then-report order: a plane told of a segment storage does not have
makes a rebuild claim history it cannot produce, and a crash between the two leaves
exactly that. Asking first, a
session.registerwith the epoch and nolast_seqbefore the upload, adds a round trip to every seal and still leaves a seal's own length open: a claim between the segment and the manifest, the issue's case, overwrites the manifest, unless it asks again before every write, a round trip per object. - Not a conditional write. An
If-Matchon the manifest's ETag fences the holder's next write, not its claim: a claim moves no object, so until the holder seals, the ETag the loser holds is still the current one and its write goes through. And the daemon would choose whether to send the header; the plane would enforce nothing. - Not a manifest named by its epoch. Every reader of
manifest.jsonknows its name (a pod's ghost check, the plane's index rebuild,Storage.list_sessions/1), and the loser would still write under the prefix, which is what the issue asks it not to do. - The plane.
epochis optional and additive (protocol v1, and the plane's/rpcis not in the generated schema): named and not the row's,stale_versionwith the same data as a refused report, for whichever method; not an integer,invalid_params; not named, signed as before, which is what a restore, holding no epoch, and a daemon from before this send. - The daemon.
Private.store/3names the epoch of the row its sealer was started from on everyput; reads are not fenced, and a restore's store (store/2) names none. A refusal is{:error, :stale_version}, and the session is listedelsewherewith one warning in the log, as at a refused report (lost/1, which both use). - The sealer. A write
Storageanswers{:error, :stale_version}, the segment, the manifest or a snapshot, is the plane's fence, as a refused report is (789): it writes and reports nothing more, not even on its way down, stops with{:shutdown, :stale_version}, is not started again (restart: :transient), andseal_now/2answers{:error, :stale_version}. A seal whose manifest was refused makes no report, which the plane would refuse too. The report stays a fence, for a plane from before this, which signs whatever epoch it is named: there the loser still writes a segment and the manifest before it learns, as 789 left it. A pod's store and its cast reports answer neither, so a worker's sealer is unchanged. - What is left. A write signed before the claim and sent after it: the plane cannot
take back a URL. The daemon signs each object just before it puts it, so the window is
one upload in flight when the claim lands. If that is the segment, it is at the old
epoch from the row's
last_seqon, where the holder seals too, at a higher epoch, which a restore's chain prefers (Storage.live_segments/1); if it is the manifest, the holder's next seal writes it back, as 789 said of every such overwrite, now narrowed from a seal to one PUT. A crash costs nothing new: nothing is reported earlier than before.
Governs: apps/troupe_gateway/lib/troupe/gateway/private.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/harness.ex, apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/sessions/sealer.ex