Every response on the plane's host carries a Content-Security-Policy that runs only this release's own script files, set by the two servers that answer there, the plane's endpoint and the GUI image's nginx, not by the ingress; the app's connect-src is the plane, the daemon at 127.0.0.1 on any port, and other hosts only over TLS¶
Decision 803 · accepted · 2026-10-06 · issue #460
- What runs.
script-src 'self'on every response, withdefault-src 'self'so the directives that fall back to it say the same: no inline script, no event-handler attribute, nojavascript:URL, noevalor string timer, no hash or nonce, no other origin.object-src 'none',base-uri 'none',form-action 'self',frame-ancestors 'none', andnosniffbeside it, so no answer on the host (a JSON body above all) can be loaded as a script it is not. - Who sets it: the two servers that answer on the host, not the ingress. The chart
routes
/appto the GUI image's nginx and everything else to the plane (Decision 670), so each sends it on every response it gives: the plane from a plug first in its endpoint (Troupe.Plane.Web.CSP), before its static files and the split between the console and the API, so a stylesheet, a 404 and/rpccarry it as a page does; the GUI fromdocker/headers.conf, included in its server and again in each location that adds a header (the file says why). Not the ingress: a response header there is an annotation each controller spells its own way (ingress-nginx's needs snippet annotations, off by default and a hazard of their own), so on another controller it would silently not be there, and a test of the rendered chart would test the annotation, not the response. A plane run without the chart, or an image run behind another proxy, keeps its policy. - Styles. The plane:
'self' 'unsafe-inline'and the fonts' stylesheet host, and their files' host infont-src. The app needs none of it: it sets styles through the DOM, which the policy does not govern, so itsstyle-srcis'self'. - connect-src. The plane's own pages connect to the plane and nothing else
(
'self': the console's LiveView socket). The app:'self',ws://127.0.0.1:*, andhttps:andwss:. The issue asked for the plane and the loopback alone, and the app could not work under that: in a browser it signs in against the identity provider directly (its discovery document and its token endpoint, across origins, in the PKCE flowpkce.tsruns) and attaches to a session at its worker's own host. Both are named at run time (the provider is a console setting, the workers' domain a policy's, and a machine worker is at any address), and the image is built once for every deployment and configured with nothing. So remote hosts are admitted over TLS only, and plaintext anywhere but this machine is refused. What connect-src could have protected is little here: a script that ran could reach the daemon without sending the token anywhere, since the daemon answers only on this machine, and a page can always leave by navigating; so the defence isscript-src, and connect-src is what the app needs. Not chosen: a policy the chart renders with the deployment's provider and workers' domain, which would go stale the moment the console changed the provider and break sign-in with a CSP error; it could still narrowhttps:later as an option.
Governs: apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/web/csp.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/web/endpoint.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/web/page.ex, apps/troupe_plane/priv/static/webfonts.js, clients/gui/docker/headers.conf, clients/gui/docker/nginx.conf, clients/gui/Dockerfile