Every URL the daemon calls for a person's own MCP server and its sign-in is resolved, every address it answers is checked against Decision 856's list, and the request goes to the address checked; loopback and the private ranges stay allowed¶
Decision 875 · accepted · 2026-10-12 · issue #618 · supersedes 872
The maintainer decided the shape on 2026-10-12 (#618's comment): a person's own server may be on a private address, every URL is resolved, a link-local, metadata or unspecified address is refused wherever the name points, the connection goes to the address checked, and loopback stays.
- One rule, one module.
Troupe.MCP.Address, in the protocol app beside the MCP client.target/1resolves a name in both families (an address written as one is its own answer, in any spelling:inet.parse_address/1reads,2852039166too), checks every address withTroupe.WorkerProfile.Reach.refusal/1, and answers the first, a v4 one when there is one, or aRefusednaming the host, the address and its kind. One refused answer among good ones refuses the name. The list is 856's and 866's, so the next metadata address is refused here when it is added there, in every spellingReach.ipv4/1reads (v4-mapped, NAT64, 6to4, IPv4-compatible). - What stays open. Loopback, for a server a person runs on their own machine (741),
and everything else not on the list: the private ranges (
10/8,172.16/12,192.168/16,fc00::/7,fd00:ec2::254aside), where an intranet's servers are, and the shared address space but100.100.100.200. This is where the daemon differs from the plane, which refuses loopback and all of100.64.0.0/10(866): the plane posts on an administrator's word from inside a cluster, the daemon on a person's own, on their own machine. - The request goes to the address checked.
Addressis the request's Req adapter (options/0): the URL is rewritten to the addresstarget/1answered and handed to Req's own Finch adapter, so the connection asks DNS nothing and a name that answers one address to the check and another a moment later is not sent where no check looked. The name goes as theHostheader and as Mint's:hostname, which is the TLS server name and the name the certificate is checked against. What comes back is paired with the request as it was, named, so a redirect Req follows is read against the name and comes back through the adapter to be resolved and checked before it is sent. Doing it as the adapter, rather than resolving beforeReq.request/1as 866 does, is what holds the redirects to the rule; anotify_urlfollows none. - Which requests. The MCP client's, for a server with
pinnedset: every request of a session (the handshake, the calls, theDELETEthat ends it, which carriespinnedin the session it ends). A pod's servers are unchanged: its egress is its network policy's (856). And every requestTroupe.MCP.OAuthmakes: the protected-resource metadata, the authorization server's metadata, the token endpoint (the exchange and every refresh) and the revocation endpoint. - Checked before anything is sent, too.
outbound/2resolves now, and holds the server's URL to it as well as the token and revocation endpoints, the three a token goes to: discovery refuses a server or a token endpoint whose name leads to a refused address, with the sentence (the token endpoint (https://…) resolves to 169.254.169.254, a link-local address), before the person is sent to a browser for a sign-in that could not be redeemed. A name that resolves to nothing is refused there too (does not resolve (nxdomain)). A metadata document whose address is refused ends discovery with why, rather than being passed over as a place with nothing there. Each request is checked again when it is made; the two lookups may differ, and the second is the one the request goes to. - The authorization endpoint is the person's browser's to open, not the daemon's, so
nothing can pin it. Its name is resolved at discovery and refused at the same addresses,
which turns away metadata that points the browser at one; a name that does not resolve
on this machine is left to the browser, which may reach it through a proxy the daemon
does not use. No registration endpoint is called (dynamic registration is out of 741's
slice); one would go through
Addresslike the rest. - The token endpoint follows no redirect. A code or a refresh token goes to the
endpoint the metadata named and nowhere it points, as the metadata and revocation
requests already did. The MCP client still follows a server's redirects (a server
mounted at
/mcp/that redirects/mcpis common), each checked. - This supersedes the part of Decision 872 that said a name is not resolved for the revocation and token endpoints' check.
- Not done: the plane's
Notifykeeps its own resolve-and-pin (866) rather than callingAddress, since its rule differs and it follows no redirect; the two could share the mechanics. Happy-eyeballs fallback to a second address is not attempted, as Mint did not attempt it before.
Governs: apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/mcp/address.ex, apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/mcp/client.ex, apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/mcp/server.ex, apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/mcp/sessions.ex, apps/troupe_core/lib/troupe/mcp/oauth.ex, apps/troupe_core/lib/troupe/session/mcp.ex