A worker profile's personalTools travels to the pod with each activation, a forbidding pod refuses before any challenge and logs it, and a client takes a forbidden refusal as the answer for the whole attachment¶
Decision 879 · accepted · 2026-10-12 · issue #595
Decision 862 settled that a worker profile may forbid people offering their own signed-in
tools to its pods, with allowed as the default, and that a forbidding pod refuses
tools.register with a sentence, logs it and registers nothing.
- The setting is
spec.personalTools,alloworforbid. A word rather than a boolean, as the issue spelled it, so a later middle setting (say, only some servers) has somewhere to go. The resource declares the two words and no default, so no existingWorkerProfilechanges when the chart is upgraded: absent isallow.Fleet.Profile's changeset refuses any other value,nullincluded, foradmin.profile.putand the gitops reader alike, because a pod reads onlyforbidas forbidding and a"Forbid"saved would leave the pods taking what the admin believes they refuse. - It rides the activation, not the pod's environment. As
repositoryOverridesBundledoes (Decision 826), and for the same reasons: an environment variable the operator set would replace every pod of the profile to change it, and ansshprofile has no pod template.Harness.bundle_params/1, which already reads the profile's row at every activation, sendspersonal_toolsbeside the pin; the worker passes it to the session as the config fieldpersonal_tools_forbidden_by, the profile's name, set only forforbidand never from a file. A change reaches a session the next time it is activated; a session awake when the admin changes it keeps what it had until then. - Refused before the challenge, as
managed_mcp_servers_onlyis. Asking somebody to consent to tools the pod will not take is worse than refusing. The answer isforbiddenwithsetting: personalTools,profile, and the sentence "the worker profiledoes not take a person's own tools on its pods (personalTools: forbid); only the profile's MCP servers are available". It covers every client-hosted tool, not only an MCP server's: on a pod, any tool a client hosts runs on somebody's machine as them. - Logged on the pod, not in the session. One
warningline per refusal, naming the session, the subject and the tools, so an operator asked why somebody's tools never reached a session finds it in the pod's log. Warning rather than info, so a pod log kept at warning still has it. The session's log records nothing, as for the platform's switch: a session has nothing to say about a tool it never had, and a refusal in it would read as something the session did. - A
forbiddenrefusal holds for the attachment, in both clients. Neither the platform's switch nor the profile's changes while a person is attached, so a client that re-offered on every new socket would only repeat the refusal. The TUI says it once, as a note in the session's window ("your own MCP servers are not offered to this session: ..."), and offers nothing on a later socket of that attachment; the desktop app's offer staysrefusedwith the session's reason, which its line shows ("Your servers could not be offered here: ..."), and lists and registers nothing on a later socket. A session opened again is offered again. This also changes what the clients did formanaged_mcp_servers_only, which they used to offer to on every socket.
Governs: charts/troupe/crds/workerprofile.yaml, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/harness.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/fleet/profile.ex, apps/troupe_worker/lib/troupe/worker/session/restore.ex, apps/troupe_core/lib/troupe/session/client_tools.ex, apps/troupe_gateway/lib/troupe/gateway/dispatch.ex, clients/tui/lib/troupe/remote/worker.ex, clients/gui/packages/client/src/offer.ts