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A worker profile's personalTools travels to the pod with each activation, a forbidding pod refuses before any challenge and logs it, and a client takes a forbidden refusal as the answer for the whole attachment

Decision 879 · accepted · 2026-10-12 · issue #595

Decision 862 settled that a worker profile may forbid people offering their own signed-in tools to its pods, with allowed as the default, and that a forbidding pod refuses tools.register with a sentence, logs it and registers nothing.

  • The setting is spec.personalTools, allow or forbid. A word rather than a boolean, as the issue spelled it, so a later middle setting (say, only some servers) has somewhere to go. The resource declares the two words and no default, so no existing WorkerProfile changes when the chart is upgraded: absent is allow. Fleet.Profile's changeset refuses any other value, null included, for admin.profile.put and the gitops reader alike, because a pod reads only forbid as forbidding and a "Forbid" saved would leave the pods taking what the admin believes they refuse.
  • It rides the activation, not the pod's environment. As repositoryOverridesBundle does (Decision 826), and for the same reasons: an environment variable the operator set would replace every pod of the profile to change it, and an ssh profile has no pod template. Harness.bundle_params/1, which already reads the profile's row at every activation, sends personal_tools beside the pin; the worker passes it to the session as the config field personal_tools_forbidden_by, the profile's name, set only for forbid and never from a file. A change reaches a session the next time it is activated; a session awake when the admin changes it keeps what it had until then.
  • Refused before the challenge, as managed_mcp_servers_only is. Asking somebody to consent to tools the pod will not take is worse than refusing. The answer is forbidden with setting: personalTools, profile, and the sentence "the worker profile does not take a person's own tools on its pods (personalTools: forbid); only the profile's MCP servers are available". It covers every client-hosted tool, not only an MCP server's: on a pod, any tool a client hosts runs on somebody's machine as them.
  • Logged on the pod, not in the session. One warning line per refusal, naming the session, the subject and the tools, so an operator asked why somebody's tools never reached a session finds it in the pod's log. Warning rather than info, so a pod log kept at warning still has it. The session's log records nothing, as for the platform's switch: a session has nothing to say about a tool it never had, and a refusal in it would read as something the session did.
  • A forbidden refusal holds for the attachment, in both clients. Neither the platform's switch nor the profile's changes while a person is attached, so a client that re-offered on every new socket would only repeat the refusal. The TUI says it once, as a note in the session's window ("your own MCP servers are not offered to this session: ..."), and offers nothing on a later socket of that attachment; the desktop app's offer stays refused with the session's reason, which its line shows ("Your servers could not be offered here: ..."), and lists and registers nothing on a later socket. A session opened again is offered again. This also changes what the clients did for managed_mcp_servers_only, which they used to offer to on every socket.

Governs: charts/troupe/crds/workerprofile.yaml, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/harness.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/fleet/profile.ex, apps/troupe_worker/lib/troupe/worker/session/restore.ex, apps/troupe_core/lib/troupe/session/client_tools.ex, apps/troupe_gateway/lib/troupe/gateway/dispatch.ex, clients/tui/lib/troupe/remote/worker.ex, clients/gui/packages/client/src/offer.ts