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A sign-in or a SCIM push adopts the row SCIM gave its subject as externalId only when that row's email or userName agrees, and otherwise merges nothing, audits it and lists the pair; a SCIM PUT replaces the person at its id; a push under removed: or svc: is refused; a removed person comes off notify lists and their spend goes to the tombstone; and the chart's control port takes TLS only by default, saying a plaintext refusal once a minute per address, with a PlaneCAMissing condition on a profile whose namespace has no CA

Decision 906 · accepted · 2026-10-16 · issue #715 · supersedes 759, 899, 902

Superseded in part

In part by 909, 914.

This replaces the part of Decision 899 that adopts on the externalId alone and its "Not done" about removed: subjects at SCIM; the part of Decision 759 that keeps a PUT keyed on its body and answers a refused POST or PUT without SCIM's error body; and the part of Decision 902 that leaves requireTls off in the chart, logs each refusal, and says no profile status reports a missing CA. The rest of all three stands.

An adoption needs the email or the userName to agree. A sign-in, or a SCIM push, that finds nobody under its subject but finds the row SCIM gave that value as externalId (Decision 899) takes the row over only when the row's email or its userName equals, ignoring case and surrounding space, what the sign-in or push carries: a token's email, and its preferred_username (else upn); a push's primary email and its userName. Identity.adoption/3 answers :none, {:adopt, row} or {:refused, row} for both doors. The externalId is one provisioning attribute; mapped wrongly, it alone handed one person's row, sessions, shares and team administration to whoever signed in under that value. A second attribute from the same provider has to be mapped wrongly the same way for that to happen. A token or push that carries neither value has nothing that agrees and is refused: an MCP client's access token without email or preferred_username, as the first sign-in after a claim switch, makes a row of its own. That is the cost of not guessing, and the pair is listed for it.

  • Refused, nothing is merged. A sign-in gets a row of its own under its subject, as any first sign-in does; the row SCIM made stays where it was, with everything on it. A push cannot make a second row, since users.external_id is unique (899), so it is refused 409 with scimType uniqueness (RFC 7644 §3.12), which a provider shows in its provisioning log, and changes nothing. A PUT to the row's own id is not an adoption and is unaffected.
  • Audited and listed. Each refusal is person.adopt_refused on the audit trail, by the signing-in subject or by scim, naming the subject, the row's id and subject, and which door, and nothing the token or push said about the person; it is logged the same way. admin.identity.duplicates lists each refusal that still stands, a set with by: "external_id": the row SCIM made and, for a sign-in, the row the sign-in made, with what to do in likely. It is read from the audit trail because a refused push leaves no second row to find; a refusal stops being listed once the row is under its externalId again or is gone. Look-alike sets that only repeat a listed pair are left out.

A SCIM PUT replaces the person at its id (RFC 7644 §3.5.1). SCIM.replace_user/2 fetches the row by the id in the path, and a body that would key it on another subject, a different externalId or, without one, a different userName, is refused 400 mutability, the rule a PATCH already had (754); otherwise the body is written to that row under its own subject. A refused POST or PUT now answers SCIM's error body (scimType, detail) like every other refusal.

removed: and svc: are refused at SCIM as they are at sign-in: a push whose subject, externalId else userName, starts with either answers 400 invalidValue. A person under one could never sign in and would be named where a removed person's sessions or a principal are.

A removed person's subject names nothing they leave behind. Identity.remove_user/2 takes the subject off every trigger's notify list (the audit's notified_by names the triggers), so a person provisioned later under it is not let into the next run; and moves their usage records and reservations to the tombstone's marker, so a cap read by subject starts at nothing for whoever arrives under it, while a team's totals, which are by team, do not change. A trigger's revisions are history and keep the list they were written with; the next firing makes a revision from the trigger as it now is. In gitops mode the repository's notify comes back at the next change to the resource, as for a move (751).

TLS only by default. The chart's plane.controlTls.requireTls is true. Every pod a 0.19 operator made dials with TLS, and 0.19's operator gave every new pod template the CA, so by 0.20 a pod still in plaintext is one an older operator made and its drain has not replaced. routine-tasks.md says what to check before upgrading: each pod's enrolment line on the plane says "over TLS" or "in plaintext", and none still running may say the second; requireTls: false keeps such a pod enrolling until it is replaced. The chart still refuses requireTls without enabled, and its message now says to set both, since the default is on: silently dropping the requirement when TLS is off would be a setting that means nothing. The plane's own default, with no chart, stays off: a plane started without TROUPE_PLANE_CONTROL_TLS_DIR has no certificate to require.

A refusal is said once a minute per address. A pod an old operator made reconnects every 250 ms to two seconds until it is replaced, and with TLS required each connection was a warning. Troupe.Plane.Control.Refusals keeps, per peer address (not port, which changes at each reconnect), when the last line was said and how many went unsaid since; the next line after a minute carries that count. A public ETS table the listener owns, as Replay's is; an address quiet for an hour is forgotten. Two refusals from one address at the same instant may both be said.

PlaneCAMissing on a profile. Where the installation gives pods the plane's CA (TROUPE_PLANE_CONTROL_CA set, from plane.controlTls.enabled), each pass looks for the troupe-plane-ca ConfigMap in the profile's namespace after applying: True with NotWritten and the file it could not read when there is none, False with Present when there is, and False with NotGiven where pods are given no CA. Looked for rather than inferred from the pass, since a pass that could not read the file leaves the CA an earlier pass wrote. Beside SecretMissing, not part of Ready, for the same reason: the profile reconciled.

Governs: apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/identity.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/login.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/scim.ex, apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/control/refusals.ex