The plane records, per person and component, the version, platform and times of the client it last served at initialize, one row moved on and never a history, and an administrator reads it beside the policy; the credential stores are exercised on a real macOS keychain and Secret Service in CI, the daemon keeping a value too long for one security -i line in parts; session_tainted carries the person's display name beside their subject; and the desktop app asks again about a server signed in to while attached and offers only the servers ticked¶
Decision 937 · accepted · 2026-10-24 · issue #657
The plane records each client's version¶
A policy (Decision 868) was set blind: nothing said how many clients a raised minimum
would turn away, or who was behind. The plane already reads each client's component and
version at initialize; now it keeps them.
- One row per person and component, never a history.
clients_seenis keyed by the person's row (user_id, so a subject rekeyed under Decision 751 keeps it, a person folded into another takes theirs away, and a removed person's go with them) and the component. It holds the version, the platform whereclient_infonames one, when that version was first seen (since, which moves only with the version) and when the client was last seen. "Who is behind" is a question about now; a history would be a table nobody reads that grows with every daemon's thirty-second handshake (Decision 931). - Recorded only for a client the plane served. One refused with
update_requiredis not written: its row stays as it last was, whichstandingthen counts as refused. One the plane cannot place, and a service principal (no row), are not recorded. A database that cannot be written is logged and the client served all the same. - Cheap at thirty seconds. One upsert whose update is skipped when the version and the
platform are unchanged and
seen_atis under five minutes old, so most handshakes write nothing.seen_atis right to within those five minutes. - Read beside the policy.
admin.clients.getanswersfleetper component: how many arecurrent,behindthe recommended version, andrefused(below the minimum or blocked, judged byClientUpdate.judgeagainst the policy as it is now), and the people with theirstanding. A team admin's is their visible teams' members, a platform admin's everybody's.admin.clients.putanswers and auditsaffected, the same counts against the new policy. The console's Client versions page shows a count line per component and a filterable list of who is behind, oldest first; the Overview says "n clients behind the recommended version" among what needs attention when n > 0. - Nothing new for a person.
initialize's answer is as it was; no protocol method is added. The daemon now sendsclient_info.platform(<os>/<arch>); a label of at most 64 printable characters, and anything else is dropped.
The credential stores, on CI¶
- A workflow of its own.
keyring.yml, called byci.ymland bydev-check.yml(as the cluster suite is, since a fixer's Windows machine has neither store) when the code that keeps a secret in one changes, and in a full run: the protocol's keyring test on amacos-14runner against a keychain the job makes, unlocks and sets as default, and on Linux againstgnome-keyringon a session bus of the step's own, with a login keyring made and unlocked with a password of the job's own; and the desktop crate'ssecrets.rstests on the Mac. - Skipped where there is no store, failed where there should be one. Both tests print
SKIPPEDand pass on a machine with no store; the jobs setTROUPE_KEYRING_REQUIRE=1, so a store that did not come up fails them rather than passing green with nothing run. - macOS: parts past one command line.
security -ireads each command as one line of at most 4096 bytes, so a value whoseadd-generic-passwordline would be longer is kept in parts in Decision 935's layout (<entry>/0..n-1,<entry>=troupe-parts:<n>, 2048 bytes a part, never inside a character). This narrows 935's "elsewhere a value is one entry" for the daemon on macOS; a value that fits is still one entry, and the desktop app's keyring crate, which calls the keychain directly, keeps one entry there. Linux'ssecret-tooltakes the value on standard input and has no such limit. - What the Secret Service job found.
secret-tool clearexits 1, printing nothing, where no entry matched, whichdelete/1answered as an error; deleting what is not there is:ok, as on the other stores and asTroupe.Keyringsays.
A tainting event names the person¶
session_tainted's actor is the identity's subject (subject_of/1). On a plane whose
subject claim is opaque that is an identifier, so "names the person" failed (A41's walk).
- Both, not instead. The event keeps
actor(the subject, which says who to the system and which earlier clients print) and gainsdisplay_name, the actor's name as the sign-in gave it: on a pod the session token'sname, on a laptop the daemon's fromme. Absent where there is none. - The sentence. The terminal and the desktop app say "
offered tools that run on their own machine: …", the subject where the event has no name, "somebody" where it has neither.
The desktop app's offer, per server and on sign-in¶
D50's first edge: a person's servers were offered once per attachment, all or none, and a server signed in to while attached waited for the next attachment.
- Asked again on a new server.
ServerOffer.refreshlists the servers and, when one signed in has not been asked about in this attachment, asks again over the socket it offered last. The desktop calls it when the window comes back to the front, where a person returns from the browser that signed them in, and every thirty seconds for one signed in from the terminal. A list call, no registration, when nothing is new. - Per server, all by default. The question lists every signed-in server, each a box:
ticked, except one the person left out before in this attachment. Only the ticked
servers' tools are registered; where that is fewer than the session asked about, a
fresh challenge for those alone is spent, so a consent covers exactly what is offered.
A server unticked on a later question has its tools taken back (
tools.unregisterwith their names, which the gateway already takes). "Not now" changes nothing already offered and leaves the new servers out; nobody is asked again until another server is signed in to. At the first question it leaves every server out, as before. - The rest as it was. A socket that comes back registers what the person chose without asking; a different set of tools from the same servers is asked about again; a session that takes no person's tools refuses for the attachment (Decision 879).
Governs: apps/troupe_plane/lib/troupe/plane/clients_seen.ex, apps/troupe_gateway/lib/troupe/gateway/plane.ex, apps/troupe_protocol/lib/troupe/keyring/os.ex, .github/workflows/keyring.yml, clients/gui/packages/client/src/offer.ts, clients/gui/apps/desktop/src/views/Offer.tsx